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VIOLENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA* 
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SAMUEL ANDREAS ADMASIE 
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the role of trade unions and of the Kebele - the most local urban 
administrative structures of the Ethiopian state - in the making of the red terror, a period of 
unprecedented political violence that closely followed upon the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. 
Drawing on a broad range of new source materials - from labour union files to oral histories 
and East German State Security archives - the article shows how the red terror was in large 
part the product of synergies between diverse groups and actors within these structures, and 
how it was rooted in histories, motives and collaborations that have scarcely featured in the 
historiography of revolutionary Ethiopia. In turn, the red terror radically reshaped both trade 
unions and Kebele administrations, affording Ethiopian state actors unprecedented means of 
control over civil society and over urban residents.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1974, the long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I was brought to an end by a spiral of 
protests, mutinies and demonstrations that evolved into “sub-Saharan Africa’s one undoubted 
social revolution”.1 A quick succession of changes including the establishment of a military 
government, the abolition of the monarchy and wide-ranging land reform radically 
reconfigured Ethiopia’s political structure and social relations. In light of the extensive 
violence of the following years, many Ethiopians soon forgot that the radical changes that 
swept across the country in 1974 had initially been celebrated as Abyot yale menim dam - a 
revolution without [the shedding of] any blood. Amid the turmoil generated by the Ethiopian 
revolution, unprecedented political openings had emerged: initiatives were launched to 
empower hitherto marginalised groups, fierce public debates took place over the path to a 
 
* We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers and to Justin Willis for their insightful comments on an 
earlier version of this article. The first author received financial support for the research on which this article is 
founded from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Corresponding author: Jacob Wiebel, 
jacob.wiebel@durham.ac.uk 
1 Christopher Clapham, ‘Revolution in Ethiopia’, book review in The Journal of African History, vol. 35 
no.2, 333. 
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more equitable society and new political movements were formed. Yet accompanying and 
punctuating these changes were increasing instances of armed confrontation, and of state 
violence against dissenting groups. In urban Ethiopia, such conflict culminated in the red 
terror of 1977 and 1978, in which the country’s new military government, known as the 
Derg, sanctioned and facilitated the systematic extrajudicial repression of opposition 
organisations. A decade after its end, a prominent Derg official described the red terror as 
“violence which had no parallel in Ethiopian history”.2  
It is certainly true that even in a century of Ethiopian history that has seen violent colonial 
occupation, border wars, decades of civil war and repeated famine, the red terror stands out as 
one of the most egregious instances of systematic human rights abuses.3 Tens of thousands 
were murdered, the precise number elusive because killings were often secretive and 
decentralised.4 Tens of thousands more were extrajudicially detained and heavily tortured. 
Hundreds of thousands found their lives transformed by the period’s violence: losing 
children, siblings, relatives or friends, or living with physical and psychological impairments 
caused by torture. Many were forced into an exile so common that it contributed to the 
formation of a permanent Ethiopian diaspora, while those who stayed had to acquiesce to an 
authoritarian regime under which political freedoms collapsed alongside real wages. The 
political openings and widespread political activism of the Ethiopian revolution were undone 
and eclipsed by state violence during the red terror. The result was a politics far removed 
from the ideals of 1974 and more closely resembling that of many other African states in the 
wake of the 1973 oil crisis, marked by authoritarian rule, economic mismanagement and 
ethnonational insurgencies.  
The terror gained infamy for the forms as much as the scale of its violence: bodies of 
executed regime opponents were displayed on the streets for days, bearing placards 
denouncing them as ‘counter-revolutionaries’; parents were prohibited from mourning their 
slain children, prevented from performing burial rites and in some recorded instances - where 
officials had required more than one bullet for an execution - required to pay for the surplus 
ammunition used to kill their children.5 The red terror was overseen by the Derg, whose 
chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam publicly called for large-scale extrajudicial killings of 
those who opposed his regime’s leadership of the revolution.6  
The scale and brutality of the red terror reflected the threat to military rule posed by 
civilian Marxist opposition parties, which disputed the Derg’s right to lead the revolution and 
demanded an immediate transition to civilian rule. In 1976, the most significant of these 
groups, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), augmented its small-scale rural 
 
2 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, 1989). 
3 The concept of ‘red terror’ is contested and has been put to work in pursuit of divergent political projects. 
The Derg invoked it in order to portray its violence as legitimate in the face of allegedly anti-socialist resistance 
and to cast its opponents as counter-revolutionaries. More recently, the concept has been used to 
compartmentalise and denounce particular forms of violence during this period, a shift that had also affected the 
conceptualisation of terror in the aftermath of the French revolution. This paper refers to ‘red terror’, in keeping 
with historiographical convention, to describe the violence sanctioned by the Derg and thus named at the time. 
4 See the discussion in J. Wiebel, ‘The Ethiopian Red Terror’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African 
History (Oxford, 2017). 
5 J. Abbink, 'The impact of violence: the Ethiopian "Red Terror" as a social phenomenon' in Peter J. 
Bräunlein and Andrea Lauser (eds.), Krieg und Frieden: Ethnologische Perspektiven (Bremen, 1995), 137; First 
author’s interview with Kassahun Berhanu, 24 August 2012. 
6 Bahru Zewde, ‘The History of the Red Terror: contexts and consequences’ in Tronvoll, Kjietil, Charles 
Schaefer and Girmachew Alemu Aneme, The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials (Oxford, 2009), 27. 
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insurgency with an urban guerrilla tactic. This strategy revolved around the targeted 
assassination of regime members and alleged collaborators, especially supporters of the rival 
All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Meison). Widely remembered as ‘the white terror’ - an 
infelicitous epithet, as the Marxist EPRP also regarded its violence as revolutionary and 
hence as ‘red’7 - this anti-regime violence raised the stakes for the Derg, making the 
dismantling of the EPRP’s cell structure, social bases and operational capabilities a priority 
rivalling the fight against Eritrean rebels in the north. In a revolutionary situation perceived 
as a dangerous atrocity environment by many of its leading figures, red terror was conceived, 
organised and justified by Derg radicals as a matter of public security, revolutionary progress 
and national interest. 
How the Ethiopian red terror should be understood and explained remains heavily 
contested. The historiography of the Ethiopian revolution has at times served as a platform 
for the continuation of political rivalries long settled on the ground, and continues to be 
replete with arguments intended to either justify or denounce particular actions or groups.8 
Yet despite the diversity of viewpoints within this literature, the analytical areas of focus and 
the narrative frameworks employed to explain revolutionary violence have been surprisingly 
similar. Three concerns or approaches dominate the scholarship: firstly, a growing literature 
examines the dynamics of the student movement, which grew in size and militancy through 
the 1960s and issued in divisions and factions that energised the red terror.9 Secondly, several 
analyses have concentrated on the party politics and fragmentation that grew out of this 
student movement, dominated by the EPRP and Meison.10 And thirdly, some studies have 
traced the influence of power struggles within the Derg on the evolution of Ethiopia’s 
revolutionary violence.11 The few studies that have treated the red terror as a subject in its 
own right, rather than merely as a violent aftereffect of the revolution, have combined all 
three of these approaches to make sense of its violence.12  
These three foci are important and indeed necessary for explaining the Ethiopian red 
terror. However, they are also insufficient. Their common limitation concerns the level of 
analysis at which they operate: all three approaches presuppose the precedence of affairs of 
state, or of political movements that sought to revolutionise or capture the state apparatus, 
over alternative arenas of agency, meaning and tension.13 The result has been the assumption 
 
7 Democrasia, vol.4, no.11, 5. First author’s interview with Gedion Wolde Amanuel, 19 March 2012. 
8 Compare e.g. the distinct periodisation and account of culpability in Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation, Part 
II: Ethiopia: Transformation and Conflict. The History of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (Lanham, 
1998) and in Andargachew Assegid, በአጭር የተቀጨ ረጅም ጉዞ: መኢሶን በኢትዮጵያ ሕዝቦች ትግል ውስት ['A Long Journey 
Cut Short: Meison in the Struggle of the Ethiopian People'] (Addis Ababa, 1993 E.C. [2000]). 
9 See esp. Bahru Zewde, The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c.1960-1974 
(Oxford, 2014); Messay Kebede, Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974 (Rochester, 
2008); Paulos Milkias, Haile Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia (New York, 
2006); R.R. Balsvik, Haile Selassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-
1974 (East Lansing, 1985). 
10 See esp. Bahru Zewde, 'The History’; Andargachew Assegid, በአጭር የተቀጨ ረጅም ጉዞ:; Kiflu Tadesse, The 
Generation, Part II; Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1987: a Transformation from an 
Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (Cambridge, 1993). 
11 See esp. Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution; R. Lefort, Ethiopia: an heretical revolution? 
(London 1983 [Paris, 1981]); F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981). 
12 See Bahru Zewde, ‘The history of the Red Terror’; Gebru Tareke. 'The Red Terror in Ethiopia: an 
historical aberration.' Journal of Developing Societies, vol.24, no.2 (2008), 183-206. 
13 The concept of ‘levels of analysis’ is here being used in the sense elaborated by P. Williams, War and 
Conflict in Africa (Cambridge, 2011), 35-52. 
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of a top-down model of state terror, whereby the meanings of violence originate only with 
actors and conflicts at the ‘political centre’ and all local violence is treated as reducible to 
these actors’ decisions and interests. Where the sheer diversity and lack of discernible logic 
defining the terror on the ground precludes such reasoning, analysts have fallen back on a 
common analytical binary identified by Stathis Kalyvas:14 if violence cannot be explained by 
macro-political tensions and interests, it must be senseless and anarchic, the outworking of an 
unintelligible Hobbesian chaos.15  
The persistence of such binary approaches to violence in the historiography of the 
Ethiopian revolution is both unfortunate and puzzling in light of insights developed by 
scholars working on conflicts elsewhere on the continent. In contexts as diverse as the 
Kenyan Mau Mau Emergency, the 1972 reprisals in Burundi, the Angolan civil war and the 
Rwandan genocide, historians have highlighted the extent to which political violence was 
shaped by the synergy of actors that operated at different ‘levels of analysis’ - from national 
government to local neighbourhoods - but within shared violence-facilitating institutional 
settings. 16 In unfortunately characteristic isolation from wider developments in African 
Studies, historical work on the red terror in Ethiopia lags behind these approaches, limiting 
itself instead to the reproduction of interpretative frames within which local perpetrators and 
institutional contexts of violence can be treated as subsidiary and interchangeable.17 Nor are 
such frames limited to academic scholarship: in 2010, Ethiopia’s most significant memorial 
to the period’s violence, the ‘“Red Terror” Martyrs’ Memorial Museum’, opened in Addis 
Ababa’s central Meskel Square. Its permanent exhibition represents the red terror as a 
straightforward if particularly brutal instance of state violence, designed and executed by the 
Derg and its security apparatus against a young generation that had stood up for greater 
freedom and justice in Ethiopian society. There is no sense in this narrative that political 
violence in revolutionary Ethiopia might have sprung from other types and arenas of 
antagonism or have been made possible by concomitant social and institutional changes, nor 
indeed that large numbers of civilians became complicit in the performance of this violence.  
Over against such narratives, this paper demonstrates how revolutionary Ethiopia’s 
political violence was shaped by agents, by institutional contexts and by social tensions in 
milieux that have hitherto been overlooked or mistakenly regarded as reducible to established 
interpretative frames. It was the negotiated interaction between actors operating in different 
spheres and at different levels of influence, rather than merely an imposition of state violence 
‘from above’, that shaped and defined the red terror. In urban Ethiopia, these interactions 
were particularly concentrated and consequential within two settings: on the one hand in the 
labour movement with its associated struggle over control of trade unions, and on the other in 
the newly formed and most local administrative structures of the Ethiopian state in urban 
 
14 S. Kalyvas, 'The ontology of "political violence": action and identity in civil wars.' Perspectives on 
Politics, vol.1, no.3 (2003), 475. 
15 Thus e.g. Bahru Zewde. ‘The History’, 28-9. 
16 See D. Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and Decolonization 
(Cambridge, 2009); A. Russell, ‘Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972’ International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, vol.48 no.1 (2015), 73-91; J. Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict in Angola (Cambridge, 2015); S. 
Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, 2006). 
17 Comparative elements in studies of the red terror have been limited to engagement with the ‘classical’ 
revolutions of France and Russia - most explicitly in. Gebru Tareke, 'The Red Terror in Ethiopia’- and a 
discussion of divergent state violence in Ethiopia and Cambodia: E. Kissi, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia 
and Cambodia (Lanham, 2006). 
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areas, the Kebele. As this article argues, the histories of trade unions and Kebeles, and of the 
diverse actors who worked within these institutions, need to occupy a central role in our 
understanding of political violence in revolutionary Ethiopia.  
Source materials for examining these histories are as rich as they are heterogenous: the 
extensive archives of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) are yet to be 
brought to bear on the historiography of the red terror, as are the surprisingly revealing files 
in the archive of the East German Ministry of State Security, which collaborated closely with 
the Derg from 1977.18 This article triangulates these archival materials with oral interviews as 
well as with materials familiar to scholars of the Ethiopian revolution - from government 
newspapers and radio broadcasts over clandestine pamphlets to government proclamations 
and diplomatic correspondence - to rethink the history of the Ethiopian red terror. 
Read alongside each other, these sources suggest the need to rethink the history of 
revolutionary Ethiopia’s political violence in at least the following three ways, explicated 
throughout this article: firstly, the scale, forms and targets of the red terror were closely tied 
to developments within trade unions and Kebele administrations, institutions which shaped 
this violence whilst also being radically and consequentially reshaped by it. Secondly, much 
of the period’s political violence developed in marked continuity with pre-existing patterns of 
tension and conflict ‘from below’, among actors and groups that have not been accorded 
sufficient attention or recognition in the historiography. And finally, the history of the red 
terror needs to be recognised as the history of conflicts, synergies and negotiated alliances 
between these actors and the more familiar cast of protagonists in the red terror, including the 
leaders of the Derg. It was through these shifting alliances, marked by the mutual 
appropriation of the other’s interests and resources, that the large-scale violence of Ethiopia’s 
early revolutionary years was produced, with lasting consequences for social and state-
society relations in Ethiopia. 
 
 
REVISITING THE BERHANENA SELAM KILLINGS 
 
The perhaps best-known killings of the red terror offer a revealing vantage point onto the 
need to rethink the period’s violence. The events surrounding the extrajudicial killing of nine 
workers of the Berhanena Selam Printing Press are widely recounted: on 23 March 1977, the 
workers were arrested at their workplace in Addis Ababa’s Arat Kilo neighbourhood before 
being detained, tortured and, later that night, shot dead.  Among the executed was Daro 
Negash, a mother of eight who was due to deliver her ninth child within weeks. Their remains 
were found in a riverbed the following morning. Responsible for the assassinations was an 
Abyot Tebeka [‘revolution defense’] squad commanded by Kebele chairman Girma Kebede, 
an enthusiastic participant in the red terror. Even in revolutionary times, the killing and 
inhumane disposal of a heavily pregnant mother triggered such public outrage that Derg 
leaders felt compelled to distance themselves from this violence; ten days later, Girma 
Kebede and five of his aides were themselves publicly executed.19  
 
18 Officially the archives of ‘The Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the 
former German Democratic Republic’, located in Berlin. 
19 Ethiopian Herald, 'Six Persons Executed for Dastardly Inhuman Murder of 24 Persons', 3 April 1977. 
First author’s interview with Estifanos Terefe, who witnessed the public executions as a teenager, 10 September 
2012. 
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In the historiography, the murder of Daro Negash and her colleagues is held up as the 
paradigm case of “gratuitous killings by psychotics” set loose by the terror, an act betraying a 
mind-set that “only a psychiatrist could fathom”.20 Maaza Mengiste’s novel Beneath the 
Lion’s Gaze sees a protagonist describe the murder as the epitome of the terror’s senseless 
violence: “all she did was work at a printing press [and they] killed her. A pregnant 
woman!”21 Since the killings of Daro Negash and her colleagues do not seem to fit with the 
known rationales for political violence in revolutionary Ethiopia, they are instead ascribed to 
the realm of individual psychopathology.22  
Yet when the background to the Berhanena Selam killings is more closely examined, 
palpable rationales for this violence begin to appear, pointing to the importance of 
understanding arenas of agency and contestation that insufficiently feature in the 
historiography of the red terror. For whereas it is true that Girma Kebede may have had 
personal reasons to embrace his role with such abandon - rumours abound in Addis Ababa to 
this day about his traumatic childhood, social anxiety to fit in and experience of having been 
bullied at school - he was also following general directives and acting on sound information 
when he ordered his squad to carry out the executions. Upon closer inspection, the Berhanena 
Selam killings illustrate not so much the empowerment of irrational psychopaths as the 
aggregate logic of the red terror, shaped by the interplay between local information and 
initiative on the one hand and regime policy on the other. For whereas in public memory 
Daro Negash’s identity as a mother and employee has rendered her other identities invisible, 
her executioners were well aware of her varied roles and activities. The Berhanena Selam 
killings were carried out in line with a clear, if horrific, political logic. 
In the years preceding her murder, Daro Negash had emerged as an important trade union 
leader at the Berhanena Selam printing press. She was also a militant activist and Central 
Committee member in the clandestine Ethiopian Workers’ Revolutionary Union (ELAMA), 
an affiliate of the EPRP. Eighteen months earlier she had signed a Confederation of Labour 
Unions (CELU) resolution condemning the policies of the Derg and threatening a general 
strike.23 Subsequently, she had ensured that workers of her union would be among the few 
who honoured the strike call.24 Daro Negash’s residence had hosted secret ELAMA Central 
Committee gatherings, and she had previously been arrested for disrupting a meeting that 
sought to organise a pro-regime industrial federation.25 All victims of the 23 March 1977 
murders had been denounced in a workers’ discussion forum - a common event across 
Ethiopian workplaces during the red terror, designed to expose regime opponents among 
workers and workers’ representatives - by two colleagues, who had summoned Girma 
 
20 Clapham, Transformation and Continuity, 56; Bahru Zewde, ‘The History’, 19. 
21 Maaza Mengiste, Beneath the Lion’s Gaze: A Novel (New York, 2010), 234. 
22 As Hannah Arendt observed in Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York, 1963), pointing to individual 
dispositions in contexts of systematic violence is common but rarely provides satisfactory explanations. Cf. the 
excellent discussion in M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros and P. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers 
and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley, 2002). For a recent examination of an African 
parallel, see D. Anderson, ‘British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-Insurgency, 1952-1960’, Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, vol. 23 no.4 (2012), 700-19. 
23 Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions Archives (CETUA), CELU resolution, ‘ከመስከረም 8-11-1968 
ዓ.ም. ድረስ ተሰብሰቦ የነበረው የኢ.ሠ.ማ. ልዩ ጠቅላላ ጉባኤ ያሳለፋቸው  ውሳኔዎች’,1975. 
24 A.W. Hummel Jr, ‘Wildcat Strikes Appear to Wane’, Cable 1975ADDIS11720_b 
from the  US  Embassy  in  Addis  Ababa,  October  1, 1975,  Public Library of US Diplomacy. Available  on 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975ADDIS11720_b.html>. [Last accessed 22 July 2019]. 
25 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation, Part II, 151-3. 
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Kebede and his Abyot Tebeka squad from the local Kebele for the occasion.26 The Berhanena 
Selam killings, then, do not illustrate the gratuitous and meaningless violence of the red 
terror. Instead, they highlight the need to understand the joint production of the terror by 
actors operating at different levels of spatial and political influence, and especially the need 
to do so in relation to the violent struggles over the Ethiopian labour movement and in the 
context of the Kebele structures, which mediated much of this interaction. 
 
 
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE RED TERROR 
 
In view of the important role played by the labour movement in the politics of early 
revolutionary Ethiopia, it is surprising that the sizeable CELU archives relating to the 
movement have not been more closely examined by researchers, probably one reason why 
connections between labour activism and red terror have hitherto not been rigorously 
scrutinised. These connections took three main forms: firstly, the labour movement 
represented an important arena of struggle. Its ‘capture’ was important for instrumental 
reasons: not only was it seen to bestow legitimacy by verifying the Marxist and proletarian 
credentials claimed by all conflicting parties, but the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour 
Unions and its constituent unions were regarded as organisational assets, whose membership 
needed to be mobilised, or, barring that possibility, at the very least pacified. An augmenting 
factor was the disruptive power that workers showcased in the initial stages of the revolution. 
As an arena in which revolutionary struggle and red terror were played out, the labour 
movement was caught up in a process that would fundamentally transform it.  
A second connection: the workers and institutions of the labour movement were prime 
targets of revolutionary violence. Where such institutions did not prove sufficiently 
malleable, or even appeared openly hostile to the Derg, they were actively repressed. The 
violence directed at the labour movement was at once particularly intense and exceptionally 
focused. Whereas other urban residents risked becoming victims of Kebele squads, of search 
teams or of the various security arms of the state, workers were subject to these risks as well 
as to the dangers posed by designated factory militias, factory Abyot Tebeka squads, and 
workplace red terror committees. Both the Derg and oppositional political movements 
invested significant political and organisational resources into the struggle over the labour 
movement, resulting in levels of violence that were exceptional even in years of red terror. 
A third connection between the labour movement and the red terror concerns the role of 
workers as agents of revolutionary violence. Numerous workers participated in armed squads 
formed at their work places, designed specifically to recruit workers. In addition to workplace 
militias and Abyot Tebeka squads, these also included armed groups organised by ELAMA.27 
The labour movement and its membership thus represented an arena, an object and a subject 
of revolutionary violence. To demonstrate the extent to which political violence was rooted in 
and shaped by the labour movement, it is necessary to briefly trace the history of the 
movement’s tensions and struggles up to their peak in the early revolutionary period.  
By the time the Ethiopian revolution broke out in 1974, organised labour in the country – 
 
26 Ethiopian Herald, 'Six Persons Executed for Dastardly Inhuman Murder of 24 Persons', 3 April 1977. For 
an extensive description of such meetings, see UK National Archives, FCO 31/2257-29, ‘Embassy Cable to 
EAD and FCO’, 25 April 1978. 
27 Kiflu Tadesse. The Generation, Part II, 151-3. 
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apart from the syndicate of railway workers – had only existed for a decade and a half. From 
the outset, the labour movement had been beset by conflicting dynamics. On the one hand, 
state actors had brought their power to bear on the movement so as to ensure the prevalence 
of a moderate ‘business unionist’ leadership, which in turn spawned and supported the 
emergence of moderate and loyal leaders in basic unions. At the same time, however, a 
militant undercurrent stood in opposition to the deferential policies of such leaders, growing 
progressively stronger through the 1960s and early 1970s. This labour opposition took a 
number of expressions: it attempted to have the moderate leadership outvoted on congresses 
of the General Assembly, and it had a number of representatives serving in influential posts. 
It was also a dominant force in many basic unions, where it was the driving force of wildcat 
strikes that took place across the country.28 Although moderates retained the top positions 
within CELU, the militants gained increasing influence within central bodies and basic 
unions over time. This eventually pushed the Confederation into adopting an increasingly 
militant stance. 
Propelled by the gathering groundswell of militant energies among workers and 
constituent unions, CELU was thus involved in two highly successful strikes in 1973 and 
1974. First, it organised solidarity measures with striking bank workers, thereby forcing the 
government to concede to the latter’s demands. Then, after having the executive leadership 
subvert and stall General Assembly decisions to call a general strike for several years, a 
successful one was finally called in March 1974, again forcing the government to concede. 
The strike, which fed into the growing momentum of the 1974 revolution, led to a surge in 
prestige for CELU as well as in the number of organised workers. Their officially recognised 
number grew from around 80.000 before the strike to around 125.000 a few months after, 
although the number of workers that participated in informal networks and practices, 
including the strike, was probably far greater.29 The strike also discredited the moderate 
leadership, spelling the end of its incumbency. With the militant labour opposition ascendant, 
CELU was becoming an increasingly vocal force, on collision course with state authorities. 
When, in September 1974, the Derg seized power and suspended democratic rights, CELU’s 
General Assembly protested and threatened to call another strike. Over the coming year, 
CELU and the Derg would be engaged in a mutually hostile tug-of-war, with labour leaders 
arrested and released, offices closed and reopened, and expressions of workers’ discontent 
actively repressed. Regime efforts to re-establish a loyal and deferential Confederation by 
administrative means alone proved futile, convincing the Derg to increasingly resort to the 
use of violence instead. When ELAMA, the dominant organisation within the radical labour 
opposition, reciprocated this move, the stage was set for a militarised showdown. 
Violence was not, however, a novel feature of labour struggles that emerged only after the 
revolution. Mere months after CELU’s formation in 1963, state actors had first intervened to 
repress and replace its elected leadership. In the aftermath, veteran labour activist Aberra 
Gemu was found shot dead.30 Over the following decade, violent repression was a constant 
 
28 T. Killion, ‘Workers, Capital and the State in the Ethiopian Region’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Stanford 
University, 1985); Emmanuel Fayessa Negassa, ‘The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions and its First 
General Strike (March 7--11, 1974): Causes and Impact’,(unpublished MA thesis, Cornell University, 1977); 
S.A. Admasie, ‘Dynamics of Assertive Labour Movementism in Ethiopia: Organised Labour, Unrest and Wages 
in a Socio-Historical Perspective’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Universities of Basel and Pavia, 2018). 
29 Ethiopian Herald, ‘Organized Labour Grows in Strength in This Country’, 25 July 1974. 
30 Whether Aberra was assassinated or felt compelled to take his own life has not been conclusively 
determined. Either way, as Killion has compellingly argued, ‘the cause of his death was state repression’: 
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threat to labour activists. This included casual harassment, arrests and physical force against 
union leaders and organisers, police brutality against strikers and unruly workers, and even 
incidents involving security forces opening fire on groups of protesting workers.31 But 
workers also initiated and engaged in violent contestation. This could take the form of 
physical assault on representatives of management.32 More commonly, it consisted of 
violence within unions as different factions jockeyed for dominance.33 Yet although violence 
had thus been a feature of the labour movement from its inception, it intensified substantially 
following the revolution and the establishment of military rule.  
In 1975, the Derg declared the forced dissolution of CELU. This was followed by 
protracted efforts to set up new trade union structures loyal to the regime. The basic unions 
were retained, although subjected to pressure to elect new, regime-supporting leaders. This 
strategy encountered great difficulties, as oppositional workers displayed a tendency to re-
elect the same ‘undesirable’ representatives whom the Derg was seeking to remove. 
Moreover, clandestine structures, most prominent among which was ELAMA, were set up to 
fight back within both the basic unions and the new structures. The resistance of workers to 
the reorganisation schemes imposed from above caused such frustration to regime officials 
that, when violence began to be unleashed on the wider urban opposition in late 1976, the 
labour opposition constituted a primary target.34 
The centrality of the labour movement in the process leading up to the Red Terror can be 
illustrated with reference to the gradual escalation of violent events involving labour activists 
throughout the years following the revolution, concentrated around the annually marked 
celebrations of the revolution’s anniversary and of May Day. Thus in September of 1974, the 
newly established Derg administration came into immediate conflict with CELU. After the 
latter threatened a general strike, the Derg clamped down on the Confederation, arresting 
workers participating in the strike as well as union leaders. Over the coming two years, 
similar events would occur each September, marking the ratcheting up of the conflict. In 
1975, CELU’s General Assembly passed a resolution deeply critical of the Derg, outlining a 
series of radical demands and threatening a strike should these not be met.35 By this time, the 
Derg was prepared to respond with lethal force to such expressions of dissent, killing an 
estimated 100 workers and representatives while arresting an estimated 1600 others.36 The 
aftermath saw a state of emergency being declared, which banned strikes, slowdowns, public 
meetings and leaflet distribution, while according security forces the right to shoot suspected 
offenders on the spot.37 This sequence of events was closely paralleled by yet more dramatic 
dynamics in September of 1976: ELAMA called a general strike, which coincided with the 
EPRP’s first assassination attempt on Mengistu Haile Mariam. This strike attempt was to be 
 
Killion, ‘Workers’, 467. 
31 Killion, ‘Workers’, 537. 
32 One example of such violence was organised by the leader of the Dire Dawa Textile Factory. See Killion, 
‘Workers’, 508. 
33 Second author’s personal communication with Demmelash Tebekaw, 7 May 2015; Killion, ‘Workers’, 
512-3. 
34 Admasie, ‘Dynamics’; Kiflu Tadesse, ኢትዮጵያ ሆይ, part I (Addis Ababa, 2016). 
35 CETUA, CELU resolution ‘ከመስከረም 8-11-1968 ዓ.ም. ድረስ ተሰብሰቦ የነበረው የኢ.ሠ.ማ. ልዩ ጠቅላላ ጉባኤ 
ያሳለፋቸው  ውሳኔዎች’, 1975. 
36 ICFTU Archives, Institute of Social History Amsterdam, F. Luyimbazi, ‘Report on the Main Activities of 
ICFTU Research Office and General Labour Situation in Ethiopia, From October 1974 to date, January 9’ 
(1976). 
37 Ethiopian Herald, ‘PMAC Declares State of Emergency’, 1 October 1975. 
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the last offensive move by oppositional workers, as the repression that followed included the 
execution of hundreds of strikers and protestors.38  
May Day celebrations in 1976 and 1977 similarly escalated into violent confrontations 
between demonstrators and the Derg. In 1976, around 20 workers, who had been carrying 
oppositional banners, were fired on and killed by security forces.39 The following year, 
demonstrations called by ELAMA in collaboration with the EPRP’s Youth League for the eve 
of May Day became the subject to the most intense urban violence of the entire revolutionary 
period, as machine guns were trained on demonstrators, thousands were arrested and 
hundreds of these detainees were executed overnight.40 This progression of events 
demonstrates the gradual escalation of confrontations over the labour movement, which 
culminated in and substantially shaped the red terror of 1977 and 1978. It began with state 
actors’ intolerance of autonomous organisation, progressed to the banning of institutions and 
the arrest of leaders who refused to be coopted, before it graduated to the deployment of 
lethal force against dissenters and finally to the mass execution of civilians. 
Files from the CELU archives demonstrate how, once the red terror was proclaimed, 
unions and union officials were integrated into networks of repression through new violence-
facilitating institutions such as the workers’ discussion forums, the Abyot Tebeka squads, and 
workplace red terror committee. Union officials cooperated in the organisation, arming, and 
drafting of workers into squads and militias, and they frequently cooperated in identifying 
targets. The formal structures of the labour movement were increasingly conjoined to those of 
the new repressive institutions and initiatives, from Abyot Tebeka squads to workplace 
meetings designed to elicit denunciations. The statutes of Abyot Tebeka squads established at 
factories across the country included stipulations that they work closely with the local trade 
union, that only members of the trade union were eligible to join, and that the squads’ 
commanding committee include a trade union representative.41  
This entanglement led to cases in which trade unions took part in the purges of their own 
members and representative structures. In 1978, for example, the national confederation of 
trade unions, now renamed All Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), reported that an unspecified 
number of “right roaders” - a common derogatory term for Meison sympathisers - in the 
leadership of its local union at the Metahara sugar factory had been identified, subjected to 
the workplace red terror committee, and executed.42 In other cases, unions intervened and 
pleaded the innocence of detained workers to authorities and ad-hoc committees. Thus in 
1977, for example, AETU President Temesgen Madebo, who himself was to meet a violent 
death later that year, wrote to the Derg asking for a factory worker, who had killed an alleged 
EPRP squad member in the Akaki industrial district, to be released from detention.43 In some 
cases the authorities intervened, while in others the revolutionary guards and red terror 
committees themselves acceded to such requests. Invariably, however, the release of 
 
38 Public Library of US Diplomacy, Cable 1976ADDIS10880_b from the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, 
October 8 1976 by A.T. Tienken, ‘Tensions in Addis Ababa’ [available on 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976ADDIS10880_b.html> [last accessed on 22 July 2019]. 
39 Andargachew Assegid በአጭር የተቀጨ ረጅም ጉዞ, 339. 
40 J. Wiebel, ‘Revolutionary Terror Campaigns in Addis Ababa’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Oxford, 2014), 157f. 
41 CETUA, PMAC memorandum ‘Provisional Revolutionary Guard Committee የአብዮት ጥብቃ ኮሚቴዎች 
የተቋቋሙባቸው ድርጅቶች በ26-1-70 የታጠቁ’, 1977. 
42 CETUA, AETU report ‘ከግንቦት 11 እስከ ሓምሌ 29 ቅን ድርስ ምን ተሰራ? ሪፖርት’, 1978. 
43 CETUA, Letter to the PMAC from Temesgen Madebo ‘ስለ ጓድ ዓለማየሁ ኃይሉ’, 9 March 1977. 
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detainees resulted in a formal announcement being sent to concerned institutions, including 
the detained workers’ Kebele. Such announcements raised suspicions with local authorities, 
which would increase the risk of further persecution. If unions were not always involved in 
the meting out violence, they could not escape their centrality as arenas of the red terror. 
Neither could they escape becoming targets of violence, as the movement bifurcated and the 
divisions deepened, demanding that each basic union pick a side.  
The division between a moderate and a militant strand of the labour movement, which 
had been one of its features since the early 1960, thus escalated and intersected with the 
dominant conflicts of the early revolutionary era to such an extent that it became a major fault 
line in the wider red terror. By 1977, trade union activism was an exceptionally dangerous 
activity even by the altered standards of the time: among the hundreds of union officials, 
representatives and workers who paid with their lives were the last President of CELU, 
Markos Hagos, as well as the first two Presidents of AETU, Tewodros Bekele and Temesgen 
Madebo. Yet as the preceding discussion demonstrates, the violence that occurred within the 
labour movement cannot - as is routinely the case within the historiography - be reduced to 
the familiar division between the Derg and its allies on the one hand and the EPRP on the 
other.44 Instead, the intensity of these divisions itself needs to be viewed in light of the 
preceding decade of building tensions and pressures within and over the labour movement. 
Behind the Berhanena Selam killings and similar executions, in other words, lay a history of 
profound struggle over the control and use of trade unions, which fueled a determination 
among regime loyalists at the press to resolve these tensions by eliminating the militant 
strand of the labour movement, which Daro Negash and her colleagues were seen as 
embodying. It was to this end that Girma Kebede and his notorious Abyot Tebeka squad were 
summoned from the local Kebele.  
 
 
THE KEBELE AND THE RED TERROR 
 
The importance of rethinking the role of the labour movement in energising and shaping 
the red terror is paralleled by the need to reexamine the pivotal role played by the Kebele 
administrations in revolutionary Ethiopia’s urban violence. Within the context of the Kebele 
as within the labour movement, the red terror was shaped by histories and agents that have 
been accorded insufficient attention in narratives about the period, yet whose interactions 
with the much-studied politics of state and opposition parties were decisive in generating and 
defining the political violence of the early revolutionary years. Established in the aftermath of 
the revolution as the most local administrative structures of the Ethiopian state, the Kebele 
gradually became central to the Derg’s repression of urban opponents. The influence of the 
Kebele on the scale, forms and meaning of the red terror, though variously acknowledged in 
the literature, has hitherto not been closely examined.45 Nor has the extent to which the 
Kebele themselves were transformed through their role in the red terror, with lasting 
consequences for Ethiopian politics, been sufficiently recognised. The following section 
 
44 For an example of such a reduction, see D. and M. Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution, (New York, 
1978), 185-186. 
45 Though see an exceptional recently published case study of the red terror in Addis Ababa’s Keftegna 15, 
written from the perspective of the EPRP: Nesibu Sebhat, ፍፁም ነው አምነቴ። ቀይ ሽብር፣ የከፍተኛ 15 እውነተኛ ታሪክ። 
[‘My absolute loyalty: the history of the red terror in Keftegna 15’] (Gaithersburg, 2015). 
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discusses several important connections between Kebele and red terror, arguing that the 
history of each needs to be rethought in light of these connections to the other. By drawing on 
and triangulating an exceptional breadth of sources, from oral interviews to foreign archives, 
it highlights the agency and interaction of a diverse range of actors in leveraging the Kebele 
for their purposes, giving rise to a synergy that fuelled and shaped the red terror at the local 
level. 
The structure of the Kebele, groups of which were organised into Keftegna [‘higher’] 
administrations, was established by the Derg in August 1975.46 Over the preceding weeks, 
numerous urban properties had been nationalised. The Kebele were initially founded with the 
twin goals of encouraging grassroots political mobilisation and participation as well as of 
administering the distribution, rent and upkeep of these properties.47 During their first year, 
many Kebeles began to organise thriving Youth Associations, some established Women’s 
Associations and all held mandatory political education sessions and Weyeyet Kebeboch 
[‘discussion circles’] for residents. The early Kebeles functioned with an exceptional degree 
of democratic practice, holding open elections that saw leadership positions distributed to an 
eclectic mix of respected community elders, covert opposition sympathisers and outspoken 
supporters of the Derg. At the same time, the administrative evolution of the Kebele began to 
make the potential of these structures as coercive governance tools apparent to Derg officials: 
households were numbered, residents were closely monitored by local Kebele officials and 
many were successfully mobilised for rallies and political education events. Gradually, the 
structure of Kebele and Keftegna began to afford the Derg a degree of local information and 
control over urban society with few parallels in post-colonial Africa.  
The coercive potential of the Kebele was furthered a year later, in October 1976, when the 
Derg radically expanded the powers invested in the officials staffing these structures. 
Administrators whose jobs had initially revolved around menial administrative tasks and 
efforts at political mobilisation were now charged with the control of “counter-revolutionary 
activities” within their neighbourhoods, widely displacing the regular police forces.48 The 
reforms came in response to the EPRP’s launch of an urban guerrilla strategy a month earlier, 
which had claimed its first high profile victim in prominent Meison member Fikre Merid on 1 
October.49 Meison leaders and their allies within the Derg demanded that actors within the 
Kebele be armed in response to this growing oppositional threat; the October 1976 reforms 
began to meet these demands.50 Renewed Kebele elections were held a week after the reforms 
were introduced, and probably manipulated, to ensure that all Kebeles were staffed by 
personnel loyal to the military government.51 Henceforth, significant resources were put at 
the disposal of Kebele officials. These included makeshift jails, built for the detention and 
interrogation of suspected government opponents across all Keftegnas and most Kebeles, as 
well as the formation of Abyot Tebeka militias, systematically armed by the Derg from March 
1977. Kebele officials themselves were effectively turned into violence workers, encouraged 
 
46 Thomas Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry (eds.), Ethiopia: A Country Study (Washington, 1991), 230. 
47 Abera Yemane Ab, The Defeat of the Ethiopian Revolution, 92; Clapham, Transformation and 
Continuity, 51. Interview with Abera Yemane Ab, 13 December 2012. 
48 C. Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge, 1988), 55; Lefort, An 
Heretical Revolution, 171-2. Cf. Dereje Workayehu, 'A history of police and policing in Addis Ababa under the 
Derg regime, 1974-1991' (unpublished MA Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 2009), 80. 
49 Ethiopian Herald, 2 October 1976, 'Fikre Merid Killed Here by Anarchists'. 
50 Wudu Tafete, 'Meison', 24. First author’s interview with Abera Yemane Ab, 13 December 2012. 
51 Bahru Zewde, ‘The history of the Red Terror’, 27. 
 13 
to forcefully eliminate opposition activists from their districts. Since these Kebele officials 
were also afforded substantial autonomy and impunity in exercising their new powers, the 
degree of repression and the resultant forms of red terror that emerged across urban 
Ethiopia’s neighbourhoods over the following months varied widely, and were rarely 
reducible to Derg interests or initiatives.  
The spatial pattern and varying forms of the red terror were particularly determined by 
two factors: firstly, neighbourhoods with a sizeable EPRP membership tended to be those in 
which Kebele officials and their Abyot Tebeka squads established the most intense and public 
reigns of terror. Thus in Addis Ababa, the areas around Merkato, Gulele, Tekle Haymanot, 
and from Piassa north-eastwards to Arat Kilo and Sidist Kilo became particular hotspots of 
revolutionary violence. This was not merely a result of regime directives, which tended to 
generically call for the “weeding out of counter-revolutionary elements” and left much room 
for the agency of local actors in shaping the terror.52 Rather, those who worked for the Derg 
within the Kebele structures of these neighbourhoods were perceived as particular threats to 
the EPRP and therefore regularly became targets of the party’s assassination campaign.53 
With their own lives constantly threatened and their personal security depending on the rapid 
eradication of EPRP activists in their neighbourhoods, Kebele officials and their militias in 
these areas were prone to establish brutal and public reigns of terror, which usually consisted 
of widespread detentions marked by routine torture, extrajudicial executions and the public 
display of killed bodies.54  
A second factor influenced the diverse forms and intensity of the red terror in different 
areas: since Kebele officials tended to be elected from within neighbourhoods that they were 
socially embedded in, their new positions and authority often allowed them to redress local 
histories of societal tension and structural violence. It was not uncommon for Kebele 
officials, as well as for other agents of red terror at the local level, to personally know their 
victims: not only did they live and often grow up in the same neighbourhoods, there were 
also cases in which they belonged to the same iddir [‘mutual help associations’] or even, in 
rare instances, to the same households.55 Such local ties and their histories widely affected 
how the red terror was expressed, and whom it targeted, on the ground. In some instances, 
Kebele officials used their position to protect suspected activists.56 In others, they 
appropriated the rhetoric and resources put at their disposal by the Derg to act upon local 
animosities or personal grievances. This latter dynamic is apparent in the well-documented 
case of Kelbessa Negewo, the notorious chairman of Keftegna 09 during the peak of the red 
terror.  
Like other Keftegna and Kebele officials at the time, Kelbessa was charged with 
suppressing and dismantling oppositional networks within the district under his control; like 
them, he relied on a strategy of detaining numerous local suspects in order to interrogate 
them, regularly using forms of torture. Elicited confessions and denunciations allowed for the 
mapping of clandestine cells and triggered further searches, arrests, and in many cases 
 
52 The use of depersonalising language derived from agriculture and chemistry was common. For Derg-
authorised English-language examples, see for example these headlines in the Ethiopian Herald:  'Revolutionary 
Justice Awaits Plotters: Government Warns Anarchist Elements’, 22 September 1976; 'To Root Out Internal 
Reactionary Elements: Second Round Search Campaign Begins Here’, 8 May 1977. 
53 First author’s interview with Kebere Assefa, 24 August 2012. 
54 Lefort, An Heretical Revolution, 241-2. 
55 First author’s interview with Ermias Wolde Amlak, 7 March 2012. 
56 First author’s interview with Dawit Terefe, 27 December 2011. Hiwot Teferra, Tower in the Sky, 361f. 
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executions. Such efforts at “weeding out counter-revolutionaries” served the interests of the 
Derg, to which he also regularly applied for firearms and ammunition to intensify his 
activities.57 Kelbessa’s detainees, however, were chosen according to criteria that were 
shaped by the local history of social relations in the district as much as by government 
directives. Kelbessa’s efforts targeted particularly those whom he knew to have benefitted 
from a privileged upbringing under the imperial regime. Even decades later, when three of his 
victims sued him for torture in a US Court, he disparagingly described them as “the feudal 
children”. Class did not necessarily map onto opposition to the Derg in this Gulele 
neighbourhood.58 But there were personal reasons why this became a criterion that defined 
Kelbessa’s actions: his own upbringing and prospects had been shaped by the structural 
inequalities of pre-revolutionary Ethiopia. When Kelbessa had earned a scholarship to study 
Public Health in the United States, for instance, his scholarship had, in his view, been lost to 
the nepotistic machinations of a senior official in the imperial regime, whose nephew went in 
his place.59 His Keftegna position in the context of the red terror allowed Kelbessa, like many 
other perpetrators in the red terror, to redress and reverse such power relations at the local 
level.  
In some cases, the red terror was yet more transparently shaped by the personal motives 
of Kebele officials. Girma Kebede, who oversaw the Berhanena Selam killings, is said to 
have killed his former chemistry teacher over a dispute.60 Other officials had particular 
residents detained in order to confiscate desirable property: “if you had a nice car," one 
informant recalled about his Kebele in the Tekle Haymanot neighbourhood, "there was the 
danger of being accused of it being used for EPRP robberies and confiscated, with you being 
taken to prison."61 What these examples demonstrate is that the red terror cannot be reduced 
to the familiar macro-political divisions and policies of the Derg. Instead, its violence was 
also substantially shaped by the motives and agency of actors at Kebele level, and by their 
interaction with the interests and guidelines of the Derg. Local histories, animosities and 
social relations need to be understood as central factors, rather than merely circumstantial 
ones, in the making of a terror that was jointly produced by a diverse range of actors. This 
perspective, neglected in the historiography, is invariably adopted in oral interviews by those 
who either experienced or perpetrated red terror-related violence within the context of the 
Kebele, and it features prominently in several of the memoirs recently published by survivors 
of the red terror.62  
Continuities between local histories of everyday violence and the red terror as perpetrated 
at Kebele level also came to the fore in tensions between Abyot Tebeka squads and armed 
EPRP units in the Merkato neighbourhood. Both groups recruited members from criminal 
gangs that had operated in the area since the late imperial era. One gang, known as the ‘China 
Group’, had built its influence by extorting protection money from local merchants, 
 
57 Abebe-Jira vs Negew, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, no.93-9133. 
58 First author’s interviews with Dawit Terefe, 27 December 2011, and with Ermias Wolde Amlak, 23 
March 2012. 
59 A. Rice, ‘The Long Interrogation’, The New York Times, 4 June 2006. 
60 First author’s interview with Aklilu Kebede, 20 August 2012. 
61 First author’s interview with Kahssay Tekeste, 19 March 2012; Ermias Wolde Amlak recalls a parallel 
case in his own Kebele in the Sidist Kilo neighbourhood, in which a General was killed by an Abyot Tebaki who 
then confiscated and drove his "desirable" car: first author’s interview, 29 March 2012. 
62 For a striking example, see the account of her Keftegna detention in Hiwot Teferra, Tower in the Sky. 
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resembling “a mafia in the making”.63 Its criminal activities and violent feuding with local 
rivals, notably the aptly named ‘Genghis Group’, is reflected in the records of the police 
chronicle Polis Enna Ermeja and gained notoriety across the capital.64 In the context of 
revolutionary Ethiopia’s escalating political conflicts, the ‘China Group’ appears to have been 
politicised, throwing its weight behind the clandestine EPRP. The gang henceforth carried out 
its activities in the name of the party and of its political goals. The ‘Genghis Group’ 
underwent a parallel transformation but instead allied itself with Meison and was drafted into 
local Abyot Tebeka militias, which received arms and training to repress the EPRP.65 One 
former EPRP activist noted that the ‘China Group’, like other local criminal gangs including 
the ‘Kimbibit Group’ and the ‘Urael Group’, was “taken over, disciplined and organised for 
the revolution” by the EPRP; putting their skills honed as criminals into the service of larger 
political projects, gang members “became wonderful revolutionaries”.66 Yet behind the 
political conversion and successful mobilisation, celebrated and instrumentalised by the 
EPRP and the Derg, there were significant continuities with pre-existing local histories: gang 
members’ activities continued to revolve around the extortion of money from local traders 
and the conflict with each other.67 As in other cases in which the means of state violence were 
devolved to civilians for counter-insurgency purposes, such violence was fueled and reshaped 
by the social ties and interests of its local agents even as their community relations were 
renegotiated in light of the dominant political conflicts of the day and the monopolisation of 
discourse that attended them.68 
The Kebele became central to the red terror because it was on these recently established 
institutions that the attention of actors operating at very different levels of influence was 
focused. The extent to which this was true not only for the local actors discussed thus far and 
for government leaders, but also for intelligence agents and even for some of the Derg’s 
international allies in the context of the global Cold War, is revealed by an unlikely and 
hitherto ignored set of sources: the archives of the East German Ministry of State Security 
(MfS, commonly known as ‘the Stasi’). Due to the close diplomatic relations developed at the 
time of the red terror between the Derg and socialist bloc states, including the German 
Democratic Republic, these archives contain rich materials on Ethiopia’s secret services and 
local violence.69 The new diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and and socialist states famously 
resulted in the decisive military intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Ogaden 
war, and in a broad range of economic partnerships.70 Less well-known is that they also 
issued in close collaborations between Ethiopian intelligence services and their Soviet, 
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Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian and especially East German counterparts.71  
The partnership between the Stasi and the Derg’s intelligence apparatus ran along two 
tracks: the first concerned the provision of modern equipment and training to the Ethiopian 
services. In August 1977, East Berlin dispatched a first group of Stasi advisors alongside 
materiel, chiefly state of the art radio communication equipment and communication 
interception technology.72 By the end of the year, equipment worth more than 12 million 
Marks had been gifted to the Ethiopian authorities as “material solidarity”, a figure that 
would rise further over the following two years.73 The second area of collaboration concerned 
the radical reconfiguration of Ethiopia’s intelligence services “after the example of the 
socialist states.”74 Under the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie and under the early Derg, 
Ethiopia’s intelligence apparatus had been built on an American model, trained and equipped 
by Israelis as well as by Americans.75 Rival intelligence services of the Army, of Internal 
Security and of Central Investigation all worked independently and were partly responsible 
for controlling and balancing each other. In collaboration with the Stasi, this model was to be 
jettisoned in favour of a centralised intelligence service under a new Ministry of State and 
Public Security. While the reorganisation would not be complete until 1979, first steps 
towards centralisation had already occurred by August of 1977.76  
The immediate objectives, in both cases, revolved around local intelligence gathered at 
Kebele level. There remained much room for gaining better information about local 
opposition cells and activities, but above all there was an urgent need to coordinate and 
respond to such intelligence as was being gathered through interrogations, denunciations and 
confessions. The rapid and extensive investment in radio communication technology, for 
instance, was intended to equip mobile and stationary task forces that were formed in October 
across all 23 of Addis Ababa’s Keftegnas in order “to combat hostile activities [within the 
Keftegnas]”.77 Initial efforts to centralise the work of the intelligence services likewise 
focused on the Kebele and Keftegna: the transmission, collection and processing of locally 
gathered information was successfully improved, which allowed opposition networks to be 
mapped and, through greater coordination of local interventions, to be systematically 
dismantled.78 To this end, Stasi agents stationed in Ethiopia worked directly with several 
Keftegna chairmen as well as with agents of the Ethiopian Central Investigation 
Department.79 Whereas Kebele officials like Kelbessa Negewo had acted with significant 
autonomy in seeking to repress oppositional activities in their districts during the early stages 
of the red terror, they increasingly found themselves working within centralised command 
structures by late 1977.  
The effects of these changes were soon palpable on the ground: opposition activists found 
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their phones tapped, their comrades disappearing, their infiltrators in government institutions 
exposed and remaining cell structures dissolved.80 The violence of the red terror became 
more selective and, as a result, more effective. As an internal Stasi memo noted, “the ‘white 
terror’ fanned by the counter-revolution is being crushed by the ‘red terror’ organised by the 
Kebele”.81 By late October, it could be reported that “while counter-revolutionaries continue 
their hostile activities to discomfit the population, they have become significantly less 
active.”82 The EPRP, which over the preceding years "had attracted many of the most 
educated and talented young Ethiopians” and had rapidly grown a substantial following, was 
left with a decimated leadership and unable to coordinate, let alone protect its members.83  
The party’s armed squads ceased to effectively deter collaboration with the Derg, which had 
hitherto been one of their chief objectives.84 Moreover, confessions and denunciations 
received by Kebele officials increasingly came from EPRP members themselves, who lost 
their confidence and hope in the party or simply ran out of options.85 As one disillusioned 
EPRP activist wrote, at the close of 1977 “the EPRP was fully repressed”.86  
By this point, Meison had abandoned its support for the Derg and gone underground, 
turning members of the organisation into additional targets of the red terror. The swift and 
effective repression of Meison occurred despite the organisation’s popularity among Kebele 
officials, and against objections from the regime’s East German allies, who had regarded 
Meison as a “progressive” and moderating influence on the Ethiopian government.87 The 
Kebele had by this point become effectively integrated into the command structure of the 
revolutionary Ethiopian state, bringing an end to the earlier decentralised stages of the red 
terror.88 By early 1978, Meison too was de facto eliminated, and by the end of the year an 
internal Stasi memo could note that “there is currently no oppositional group that would be 
capable of carrying out an organised subversive activity against Mengistu and his 
followers.”89   
The structure of the Kebele was central to the tragic success of the red terror, and was 
itself transformed beyond recognition by its developing role as a hub of state violence. As a 
broad range of actors - from local residents over government figures to foreign security 
experts - brought their knowledge and resources to bear on these institutions, acting 
synergistically despite a great diversity of motives, they jointly produced both the violence of 
the red terror and the Kebele as a powerfully coercive institution. Established to solve 
problems of urban administration and political mobilisation thrown up by the revolution, the 
Kebele swiftly developed into arguably the single most effective structure of state control 
over society in sub-Saharan Africa, a tool of governance so compelling that - with some 
 
80 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation Part II, 228, 324. 
81 MfS HVA 74, 176-9. 
82 ibid. 
83 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, 26; cf. first author’s interviews with Girma Bashe, 14 March 2012, and 
Gedion Wolde Amanuel, 19 March 2012. 
84 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation Part II, 157-8. 
85 This shift is widely noted in oral interviews and in memoirs of former activists. See e.g. Mohamed 
Yiman, Wore Negari; Hiwot Teferra, Tower in the Sky; Mekonnen Getu, The Undreamt. 
86 Mohamed Yiman, Wore Negari, 148. 
87 MfS HA Nr. 69, 272-7; MfS HVA 74, 183. 
88 Contra Bahru Zewde, who regards the Netsa Ermeja [‘Independent Measure’, ie the encouragement of 
autonomous extrajudicial violence in the wake of the May Day 1977 massacres by the Derg] as the final phase 
of the red terror: ‘The History of the Red Terror’, 28. 
89 Andargachew Assegid, በአጭር የተቀጨ ረጅም ጉዞ, 425-6; Wudu Tafete, 'Meison', 33; MfS HVA 74, 176-9. 
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changes - it outlasted not only the red terror but even the Derg regime itself.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analyses of the Ethiopian red terror have followed a well-worn path, entrenching a now 
hegemonic set of approaches and narrative patterns. This article has argued the need to 
rethink the history of this political violence, paying closer attention to actors, institutions and 
interactions that have insufficiently featured in the historiography. Trade unions and the 
newly established Kebele administrations in particular are shown to have acted as arenas 
within which the histories, struggles and interests of very different sets of actors - from local 
residents and militant activists to government leaders and their international allies - collided 
or converged, synergistically producing the period’s political violence. In the form, targets 
and evolution of this violence, the red terror reflected its diverse sources and the agency of its 
multiple architects. When approached from the vantage point of this joint production within 
contested institutions, defining episodes of red terror such as the Berhanena Selam killings 
appear in the new light of their social histories, as products of struggles over the labour 
movement that were made possible by the militarisation of the Kebele.  
As this paper has demonstrated, the history of collective violence in the red terror is also 
the history of consequential socio-political and institutional changes. Much as the red terror 
was shaped by the struggle of diverse actors over trade unions and within the Kebele 
administrations, so these institutional settings themselves were radically transformed by these 
tensions and the by the violence that brought an end to them. The red terror not only 
exterminated the most vibrant organisations in Ethiopian civil society, among which the 
labour movement featured prominently; it also played a role in bequeathing to Ethiopia a 
powerful and intrusive state presence at the heart of urban communities, frequently staffed by 
officials who had played prominent roles in the death, torture or detention of sizeable 
population groups within their districts. These effects of the red terror point to a wider 
dynamic: the exceptional degree of knowledge and influence over urban society at the local 
level achieved by Ethiopian state actors, frequently ascribed to the country’s distinctive 
history over the longue durée,90 also needs to be understood in light of the institutional 
transformations and political violence of the 1970s. Rethinking the red terror, then, is 
necessary for the sake of understanding Ethiopia’s consequent history, as much as it is in 
order to make sense of these violent years as a deeply significant period in its own right.  
 
 
90 As argued most recently by C. Clapham: The Horn of Africa: state formation and decay (London, 2017). 
